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THE NEED FOR A NEW
ENLIGHTENMENT:
LESSONS IN LIBERTY FROM THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY*
Norman Dorsen **
There is no way to do justice to a man so deep and humane as
Tom Emerson. He is as addicted to concepts offairness and equality
as he was 45 years ago. He has never wavered; he has never been
diminished; he has never permitted transitory events to affect his phi-
losophy or his actions. Yet he has managed to retain a soft and con-
servative style. I have never heard Emerson say a personally unkind
word about anyone, and I have never heard anyone who knew him
disparage his qualities as a man. I have never seen him trim a posi-
tion to suit the fashion, the company, or his career. I have never
heard him utter a syllable that was designed to promote or publicize
himself I have never heard him raise his voice in anger. He is no
ordinary professor of law. t
THE RELATIONSHIP between the liberal arts and free expres-
sion is potentially both profound and trite. It is profound be-
cause it implicates what are, or should be, the deepest purposes of a
free society. It can be trite because discussion of these purposes is
often superficial, even mechanical, as we pay the expected homage
to homilies we have heard from our earliest school days.
* Appearing in THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW, AND FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION
1787-1987 at 22 (J. Stewart ed. 1988) and reprinted by permission of Southern Illinois
University Press.
** Stokes Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; President, American
Civil Liberties Union; B.A., Columbia University (1950); LL.B., Harvard University (1953).
The author is grateful to Mitra Behroozi and Thomas C. Viles, former fellows in the
Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program at New York University School of Law, for
their valuable research assistance, and to Professor David Richards for helpful insights that
are reflected in the article.
t This paragraph was taken from Professor Dorsen's address to the Yale law faculty
on the occasion of Professor Emerson's retirement. Dorsen, Thomas Irvin Emerson, 85
YALE L.J. 463, 466 (1976).
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Webster defines the liberal arts as "studies (such as language,
philosophy, history, literature, and abstract science) in a college or
university intended to provide . . . general knowledge and to de-
velop the general intellectual capacities (as reason and judgment) as
opposed to professional or vocational skills."' A liberal education
is said to "seek no reward beyond itself. It portends no practicality
save to shape the capacities to think clearly, to express oneself pre-
cisely, and to reason humanely and creatively." It is "meant to in-
still a love of learning, and a love of the pursuit of learning, for its
own sake."2
Who can object to these purposes and values as so expressed?
Do they not represent the coveted realm of all educated and hu-
mane people, the Valhalla and Shangri-la of our most civilized
dreams? Similarly, I have rarely found a person who openly belit-
tles the freedom of speech. Conscious of the First Amendment-
"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press"-and the centuries of intellectual ferment and strife that
gave rise to it, we enthusiastically extol the constitutional guarantee
and its beneficent rewards.
But unreflective praise, whether of the liberal arts or freedom of
speech, is rarely useful. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes put the
matter tersely when he wrote that "general propositions do not de-
cide concrete cases." 3 If this were not so, our society, and others
less fortunate, would not be eternally facing the question of how to
connect what we learn intellectually from the liberal arts with how
we live day to day, how to reconcile the majestic teachings of West-
ern civilization with the crime, deceit, greed, and simple unfairness
that surround us. At the same time, when we examine specific
forms of expression, we find unresolved conflict within our society
over whether to protect speech that is said to threaten our national
security and sexual morality, speech that is said to offend women
and racial or religious groups, and speech that is defamatory or in-
vades personal privacy. How should we accommodate these inter-
ests with freedom of speech? Note that I have not referred to what
courts might do in particular situations but what society will do.
Courts and lawyers play an important role in the framing and reso-
lution of disputes (some may feel in the creation of disputes also).
But contrary to apparent popular belief, it is the people who decide
1. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 662 (5th ed. 1977).
2. Giamatti, A Liberal Education and Residential Colleges, YALE WEEKLY BULL. AND
CALENDAR, Sept. 6-13, 1982, at 1.
3. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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these matters. Some years ago, Judge Learned Hand said, in a cele-
brated passage, that "when liberty -dies in the hearts of men and
women.., no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to
help it."4 If this is true, it is the people and not the judges who
ultimately must defend liberal arts and free expression.
The two concepts are mutually reinforcing. Free speech is es-
sential to education, especially to a liberal education, which encour-
ages the search for truths in art and science. If expression is
restricted, the range of inquiry is also curtailed. This much I would
hope is common ground. It is perhaps more controversial that
teachers do not teach unless they take sides and express opinions,
especially provocative ones. Alexander Meiklejohn, the philoso-
pher and libertarian, held to this view. "To be a teacher, a leader,"
he says,"[one] must be going somewhere. [O]ne must be a believer
in some plan of human living."5
Conversely, the liberal arts gird free speech. They encourage
the development of human faculties, and, by providing exposure to
a world of ideas and achievements, they encourage the expression of
new ideas. The liberal arts also encourage speech by inducing skep-
ticism and tolerance, which are a direct result of the perception that
history reveals countless occasions in which human error has been
challenged and exposed. The courage to doubt is the product of a
world view, supported by the liberal arts, that includes the possibil-
ity of changing the minds of others and, often more difficult, chang-
ing one's own mind.
With these thoughts as background, I would like to turn to
some contemporary problems that engage liberal arts and free ex-
pression, and in so doing seek helpful insights from the Enlighten-
ment, the period of Western culture roughly embodying the second
half of the eighteenth century. In the popular view, this period-
and its leading thinkers, such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, and
Kant---embodied "an emancipation of mind.... a declared princi-
ple of freedom of thought, a militant ideal of rational criticism."'6
And so it did. But that is not all it did, and for the rest it earned the
enmity of political and religious traditionalists. The Enlightenment
vigorously questioned received values, including the existence of an
active god who determined human affairs. New theories concerning
4. L. HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND AD-
DRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (1. Dillard ed. 1952).
5. A. MEIKLEJOHN, Teachers and Controversial Questions, in ALEXANDER MEIK-
LEJOHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM 204, 209 (C. Brown ed. 1981).
6. H. MULLER, FREEDOM IN THE WESTERN WORLD 314 (1963).
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the nature of authority and the relationship between citizen and
state, combined with growing social mobility and urbanization,
weakened community ties and the power of governments. When
revolution occurred in the New World and in France-and when in
France it violently uprooted so much of the old ways-the philo-
sophes whose words were thought to spark the upheaval became res-
olutely linked with the chaos. Eventually, Napoleon and the
Congress of Vienna imposed a strict but uneasy order on Western
Europe.
It is easy to forget that amidst all the political change the En-
lightenment saw a vast increase in literacy-an outpouring of words
unprecedented in human history, facilitated by new printing tech-
nologies, the birth of journalism, the optimistic search for knowl-
edge, and the investigation of nature as a living, breathing,
changing, marvelous thing, displacing what for many were the ster-
ile formulas of the received order. Nature, reason, science, and op-
timism were the new bywords; Alexander Pope captured them all in
a verse dedicated to the Enlightenment:
Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in the night;
God said, Let Newton be! And all was Light.7
In looking to the Enlightenment for lessons I do not mean to
ignore its warts. Nor was the "mind" of the period uniform, any
more than was the medieval mind, although in retrospect we can
see how out of diversity and raucousness came themes that gave the
age a distinctive character. Still less do I want to suggest that the
new learning and attitudes were born virginally in the eighteenth
century. The classical tradition had its most conspicuous flowering
in the West in ancient Athens, and even before that it was evident in
the cultures of Egypt and China, to mention but two of the early
civilizations. There, also, learning was venerated and passed on,
beauty created and admired, the groundwork laid for all that fol-
lowed. Closer to the eighteenth century was the great transforma-
tion caused by the Protestant Reformation and the Renaissance of
the fourteenth, fifteenth, and early sixteenth centuries. Jacob Burk-
hardt's magnificent book The Civilization of the Renaissance in It-
aly8 shows with unmatched learning and facility how during this
period the world viewed anew the natural sciences, the beauty of
landscape, the nature of individual personality, social customs, mu-
sic, language, morality and religion, and, in an early use of the
7. Id. at 315 (quoting A. Pope).
8. J. BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY (S.G.C. Mid-
dlemore trans. 1929).
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word, humanism. Burkhardt connects all this to antiquity, particu-
larly early Rome, as the common source of many of the values of
the Renaissance. This was the heritage that the Enlightenment ab-
sorbed, rearranged, deepened, and propagated.
2
Spin the reel fast forward to the waning years of the twentieth
century in the United States. What are the great issues bearing on
freedom of expression and the liberal arts? And what are the les-
sons in liberty that the Enlightenment can provide?
We enjoy a plethora of literature and art. Exciting ideas are
afloat. By comparison with most, perhaps all, other countries we
are blessed with much freedom, including the freedom to criticize
and attack government and culture, and within limits to present
daring images to the public.
But the horizon is cloudy and gray. There are too many, includ-
ing powerful government officials, who regard much of what they
see and hear as dangerous, some of it as sinful, and our liberty as
license. The threats to free expression, and thus to the liberal arts,
are not ghosts of the future; they surround us now. The govern-
ment seeks to enjoin, on inadequate evidence, publication of secrets
of national security;9 it prevents access under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act to matters of public concern;" it overclassifies docu-
ments that bear only a tangential relation to the national interest;1 '
it prevents foreign scholars and artists from entering the United
States to lecture and perform;' 2 it labels certain foreign films "polit-
ical propaganda";' 3 it prevents Americans from traveling to certain
countries;' 4 it even prevents the export of American educational
films that "attempt to influence opinion, conviction or policy...
[or] to espouse a cause."' 5 The victims of these policies are varied,
9. See, eg., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
10. See, eg., Bevis v. National Security Council, No. 85-2933 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 16,
1985).
11. See, eg., The Nation v. Haig, First Principles, July 1986, at 7 (D. Mass. 1980)
(Center for Nat'l Security Studies).
12. See, eg., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Harvard L. School Forum v.
Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass.), vacated, No. 86-1371 (Ist Cir. June 18, 1986); Abourezk
v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
13. See Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987) (use of term political propaganda to
identify materials subject to disclosure requirements of Foreign Agents Registration Act is
constitutional).
14. See, eg., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1983), reh'g denied, 469 U.S. 912 (1984).
15. See, ag., Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
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although they congregate on the left end of the political spectrum.
The administrations that invoke the rules also vary; Democrats and
Republicans, liberals and conservatives, all have engaged in viola-
tions of free speech and an open society.
Other forms of censorship are triggered by private groups,
sometimes acting directly, sometimes through tame local govern-
ments: Generals Sharon and Westmoreland, seeking to recover vast
sums from the media for alleged harm to their reputations, bring
lawsuits for libel that inevitably chill free expression.16 The heirs to
Anthony Comstock seek to control the nation's reading habits by
banning sexually graphic material, 17 and they are aided by some
feminists who consider pornography, without persuasive evidence,
to cause sexual violence. 8 Some individuals seek to prevent peace-
ful demonstrations in their cities and towns because they object to
the message being expressed;19 others remove books from the
shelves of public school libraries.20
An especially dangerous source of censorship is the excess of
religious fundamentalism, whose zealots want to make everyone
conform to their world view. The issue is of course not Christian-
ity, which is rooted in the humanitarianism and altruism of the Ser-
mon on the Mount. It is rather the zealotry and insensitivity
evinced by some of its modern leaders. Thus, the Moral Majority
and its allies not only want their children to pray in school, they
want everyone else's to do so as well. They not only want to pre-
vent fundamentalist women from choosing to seek an abortion, they
16. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575
F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Westmoreland v. CBS, 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Westmoreland v. CBS, 596 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
17. See generally Carol S. Vance, Porn in the U.S.A.: The Meese on the Road, NATION,
Aug. 9, 1986, at 1.
18. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind.
1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); A. DWORKIN,
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); S. GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SI-
LENCE (1982); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY (L, Lederer ed. 1980).
19. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978);
Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51111. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347
(1977).
20. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Grove v. Mead
School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Johnson v.
Stuart, 702 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1983); Pratt v. Indiana School Dist., 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir.
1982); Bicknell v. Vergennes High School Bd., 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw
Community School Bd., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Cary v. Board of Educ., Arapahoe
School Dist., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Dist., 541 F.2d
577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d
289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Mozert v. Hawkins County School Sys., 579
F. Supp. 1051 (D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985).
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want to deny every woman this freedom of choice. 2 They not only
want their children to be taught "scientific creationism" as an alter-
native to science, they want every child to learn it.2 2 They not only
want to decide which books their children cannot read, they want to
decide for everyone, even to the extent of objecting to children's
stories such as Goldilocks, The Three Little Pigs, Jack and Jill, and
the story of the little boy who cooks while a little girl reads to him
from a cookbook.2 3 (These tales are said to advance feminism and
undermine Christian values.) Indeed, many fundamentalists
threaten the very basis of the liberal arts by claiming that children
should not be taught to question or think independently because to
do so encourages them to challenge the absolute authority of God.
The urge to censor is not a monopoly of any one group; the instinct
is ecumenical as some Orthodox Jews, Moslem fundamentalists,
and Roman Catholics plow the same furrow. The instances just
noted, and many others, reveal both the pervasiveness of efforts to
control speech and the vulnerability of free expression. With the
exception of the media in the libel cases, there is no powerful con-
stituency with an economic interest in protecting free speech. I re-
gret to report that book publishers are not powerful (except of
course in comparison to writers) and that textbook publishers often
bow to the demands of special interests that seek to alter the content
of school books.
To succeed in protecting free speech, it is essential to understand
why speech is so important to a free society, and the Enlightenment
can help us--despite the prevalence of censorship in the eighteenth
century. In mid-century France, even the reform magistrate of
Louis XVI, M. Malesherbes, while allowing Diderot's Encyclopddie
to be published until 1759 and other irreverent publications to ap-
pear, levied tariffs on books published abroad and rigorously con-
trolled the number of publications in circulation.24 In England,
where prior restraints were abolished with the repeal of the licens-
21. See, eg., Weyrich, Deep in Our Hearts, We're All Cultural Conservatives, Washing-
ton Post, May 19, 1986, at 23, col. 1 (nat'l weekly ed.); Campell, Church and Political Issues:
How Far is Too Far?, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1986, § A, at 8, col. I; Goldman, Weyrich, &
Campbell, Catholicism, Democracy and the Case of Father Curran, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24,
1986, § E, at 7, col. I.
22. See Edwards v. Agillard, 476 U.S. 1103 (1987) (Louisiana law requiring the teaching
of "Creation Science" violates Establishment Clause).
23. Intolerant Zealots Threaten Our Schools, USA Today, July 23, 1986, § A, at 8, col.
1; LaHaye, Offensive Textbooks Threaten Our Schools, USA Today, July 23, 1986, § A, at 8,
col. 6.
24. See H. MULLER, supra note 6, at 331 n.7.
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ing acts in 1695,25 the common law doctrine of seditious libel re-
mained in force, permitting prosecution for "false, scandalous and
malicious writing" that had "the intent to defame or to bring into
contempt or disrepute" a private party or the government.26 An
accused who pleaded the truth of an utterance merely aggravated
the offense; it was neither a defense to a charge nor mitigation. In
the American colonies there was much censorship directed from
England; and shortly after independence, in 1798, the Congress en-
acted the Alien and Sedition Laws, which closely tracked the Eng-
lish statutes.2 7 The late Justice William 0. Douglas graphically
describes how these laws, which lasted by their terms only until
1801 and were never extended, brought a "reign of terror to the
nation":
Matthew Lyon of Vermont was fined and imprisoned for criticiz-
ing President Adams and condemning his policies toward
France. Thomas Cooper was fined and imprisoned for criticizing
Adams for delivering an American citizen to the British Navy
for court-martial.... James T. Callender of Virginia was fined
and imprisoned for [writing] "Take your choice, then, between
Adams, war and beggary, and Jefferson, peace and
competency." 28
No, it was not the absence of censorship that marked the En-
lightenment. Its hallmark was the exciting new ideas that extolled
individual freedom. While the potency of these ideas waxed and
waned over the years, they eventually seeped into western thought
and, whatever the lapses in practice, became assimilated into its cul-
ture and influenced the action of governments. As Diderot, the in-
fluential editor of the Encyclopddie, says, "It seems to me that a
being capable of feeling was intended to achieve happiness through
all his thoughts. Is there any reason for setting a limit to the mind
and senses and for saying to man: You shall think only thus far;
you shall feel only thus far?" And Mercier writes that "[o]f all the
possessions of man, thought is indisputably the most essentially un-
deniable. How is it possible for despotism to have conceived the
project of stripping man of this faculty which constitutes his unique
greatness?"29 David Hume maintained that "such elemental ideas
25. 11 H.C. JOUR. 305 (1696); see also Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931);
N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 31-34, 37-39 (1937).
26. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (exp. Mar. 3, 1801).
27. Id.
28. Douglas, The Society of the Dialogue, in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION AND WESTERN
CIVILIZATION, 44, 48 (A. Cohen ed. 1964).
29. Diderot, Observations on the Instructions of the Empress of Russia to the Deputies for
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as matter, mind, and self had no clear basis in experience, and man
could no more prove the uniformity of nature than the existence of
God-a skepticism too radical for almost all his contemporaries."
But not for Kant, who adopted as a motto for the Enlightenment
Sapere aude, "Dare to Know." Nor for the Polish general Kos-
ciusko, a fighter in the American Revolution, who said, "As men
they fought for the Holy Land, it is now for Holy Liberty that they
fight."3 Nor for Montesquieu, who observed in language anticipat-
ing Burke and Acton that "[ilt is an eternal experience that every
man possessing power is tempted to ibuse it." Nor for Thomas
Jefferson, who said in 1787, as the new country was being formed:
[T]he good sense of the people will always be found to be the best
army.... The people are the only censors of their governors;
and even their errors will tend to keep these to the true principles
of their institutions .... The way to prevent irregular interposi-
tions of [the public liberty] is to give them full information of
their affairs through the channel of the public papers. 31
The Enlightenment thinkers were also acutely aware that cen-
sorship is often the product of imposed religious conformity. They
knew that Socrates had been condemned for being a cause of the
attack on Athenian orthodoxy, when in fact he was merely a result.
They knew of the censorship practiced by the medieval church and,
after the Reformation, by Martin Luther. They knew of the reli-
gious persecution of their own day, which led so many to seek
American shores in relief. While most of the eighteenth-century
philosophes professed religious belief, and some were committed
Christians, they abjured rigidity of thought and used their slight
knowledge of other cultures as a means of exposing the provincial-
ity or bigotry of contemporary Christendom. Voltaire expresses the
point with his customary sharpness: "Doubt is not a very agreeable
state, but certainty is a ridiculous one"-ridiculous because it leads
the orthodox to claim a monopoly on truth. Diderot, fearing the
use of secular power for churchly ends, says, "Experience in all
places and ages has proved the danger of proximity between the
altar and the throne." Even the most outspoken atheist of the pe-
the Drawing Up of Laws, in THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 255, 258 (L. Crocker ed. 1969);
Mercier, The Year 2440-A Dream If There Ever Was One, in THE AGE OF ENLIGHTEN-
MENT 247, 248 (L. Crocker ed. 1969).
30. See H. MULLER, supra note 6, at 319, n.7, 320, 378.
31. A. COBBAN, IN SEARCH OF HUMANITY: THE ROLE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN
MODERN HISTORY 102 (1960) (quoting Montesquieu). Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Col.
Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
55-59 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903-1904).
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riod, Baron d'Holbach, while maintaining that secular law should
govern the rights of an established religion (as in Catholic France),
says:
These laws should never intrude into dogma or seek to ferret out
the opinion of peaceful citizens. They will forever proscribe the
intolerance, religious disputes, the harangues of fanaticism, and
above all the fury of persecution. Tyranny of thought is the most
cruel, revolting, and useless violation of human liberty.... 32
These ideas radiated throughout Europe and reached American
shores. They informed the well-known purposes of the First
Amendment to the Constitution, itself a child of the Enlightenment.
The first is individual fulfillment through self-expression, the very
objective of the liberal arts. As Justice Louis Brandeis puts it, "The
final end of the State [is] to make men free to develop their
faculties."
33
The second major purpose stresses the concept of democratic
self-government, the "profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open."' 34 Such debate helps to maintain "the precarious bal-
ance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus"35 by facili-
tating social reform. The movements on behalf of labor unions,
racial minorities, and women led to the most important social re-
forms in this century.
A third and closely related purpose of free speech is its "check-
ing value" against government corruption and excess, an apparently
permanent part of the human condition.
A fourth major purpose is to advance knowledge and reveal
truth. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said that the "best test of the
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market., 36 While this may seem unduly optimistic at
times, the purifying quality of speech has been evident for centuries
in many spheres, especially the arts and sciences.
Each of these purposes can be traced to the values of the En-
lightenment. Taken together, they mount a powerful case for the
maximum protection of free speech. They form the basis for an
32. H. MULLER, supra note 6, at 255, 335 n.8 (quoting Voltaire and Diderot); Thiry,
Baron d'Holbach, Ethnocracy, or Government Founded on Morals, in THE AGE OF ENLIGHT-
ENMENT 249, 252 (L. Crocker ed. 1969).
33. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
34. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
35. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11
(1966).
36. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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intense, not a grudging, commitment. Without such a commitment,
the legislator, the administrator, the judge, or the scholar, after pay-
ing the obligatory homage to free expression, will nevertheless re-
gretfully conclude that "in this case" it must yield for reasons of
national security, or domestic order, or government efficiency, or
one of the other reasons that are regularly advanced to overwhelm
our fragile constitutional guarantee.
We must recognize that these reasons often seem powerful and
can seductively tempt policy-makers. We must recognize also that
in certain cases free speech can become too costly. All good things
can be abused. Food can gorge, drink can bloat, both can poison.
Speech that disrupts a proceeding of the U.S. Senate, that advertises
a bottle containing cyanide as aspirin, that intentionally transfers a
military secret to a foreign government, or that wakes a neighbor-
hood at 4 a.m. cannot be permitted. Further, people do say foolish
and vicious things, and we may suspect that their words cause fool-
ish and vicious acts. But to say that speculative harm traced to
language justifies restrictions on free speech is to reverse the value
judgment made by those who wrote the First Amendment and lived
through the turbulent times that begot it. The framers said, by all
means punish the lawless act but protect the freedom of speech.
Even though the Congress nodded in 1798, when it passed the Sedi-
tion Act, it soon saw the error and allowed the law to lapse. In any
event, it is now clear, as the Supreme Court said in 1964, that "the
attack upon the validity of the Sedition Act. . . 'carried the day in
the court of history.' "" The law was not only unconstitutional
but, if I may say so, counter-Enlightenment.
The maximum-protection theory that is suggested would not ab-
solutely protect the content of all speech, but it would assure that
speech can be restricted only where an identified harm results that
cannot be remedied, mitigated, or prevented by "more speech."38
Again Justice Brandeis: "If there be time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence."39 While a maximum-protection theory does not syllogisti-
cally resolve particular controversies, it does establish the correct
37. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276; id. at 298 n.1 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
38. Professor Joel Gora and I elaborated a "maximum protection" theory of free speech
in The Burger Court and the Freedom of Speech, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 28, 41-44 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
39. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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major premise under our Constitution, and it shows us the proper
approach to many recent cases.
It shows, for example, that the Supreme Court was right in re-
jecting prior restraint on speech in the Pentagon Papers case4° and
wrong in permitting it when Frank Snepp, a CIA agent, wrote a
book about the Vietnam War that concededly contained no classi-
fied information.41
It shows that libel actions such as those brought by General
Westmoreland and General Sharon should not be tolerated, but
should be decided in the forum of public opinion as the essentially
political and historical controversies that they are.
It shows that laws to restrict sexually explicit material are, in
the words of the New York Times, the product of "bluenosed cen-
sors" and "an unconstitutional assault on expression" 42 because in
the last analysis they would permit government to rule art.
It shows that attempts to prevent peaceful protests are inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment, whether such protests are directed
against labor organizers in the 1930s, civil-rights workers or anti-
war demonstrators in the 1960s, or gay activists, the Jewish Defense
League, or American Nazis in the 1980s.
It shows, finally, that the government policy that prevents
Americans from traveling to certain countries and that bars foreign
speakers or films from entering the United States on political
grounds is tragically wrong.
If one is tempted to question these assertions, one need only re-
call the sad list of those whose works have been censored through-
out history. Galileo, Shakespeare, Mark Twain, and James Joyce
are but a representative sampling of a list that in our own day in-
cludes Anne Frank, Bernard Malamud, and Kurt Vonnegut, among
scores of others whose works are the very essence of the liberal arts.
The censors in all these cases acted from a misguided moralism,
thinking that they alone knew the truth.
Bear in mind also that the question in these cases is not whether
we agree with any or all of the things that were said, but whether
the government should be given the power to decide what may be
spoken or written. Do we really want government officials to decide
what we can read and hear? The current attorney general? Any
attorney general?
40. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
41. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
42. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1984, § A, at 22, col. 1.
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Hard practical considerations also support a maximum-protec-
tion approach to free speech, because the government apparatus re-
quired to enforce limitations on speech, by its very nature, tends
toward administrative extremes. This is what Lord Acton meant
when he said that power corrupts. Professor Tom Emerson, a fore-
most scholar of the First Amendment, has explained:
Officials charged with the duties of suppression already have or
tend to develop excessive zeal .... [The] techniques of enforce-
ment-the investigations, surveillance, searches and seizures, se-
cret informers-all tend to exert a repressive influence on
freedom of expression. In addition, the restrictive measures are
readily subject ... to use for ulterior purposes.43
3
It is for all these reasons that we must cherish free expression
and resist its restraint. Elimination of restrictions on speech will do
much to enable our people to enjoy the blessings of liberty, political
and personal, including enjoyment of the liberal arts. But there are
obstacles other than the censor to the full realization of the human
spirit and a just system of freedom of expression. In conclusion I
shall suggest the nature of these problems and, where possible, con-
nect them to the Enlightenment.
The first problem is the most severe: inequality. Dean Jerome
Barron of George Washington University believes that current First
Amendment theory is captured by a "romantic conception of free
expression, a belief that the 'marketplace of ideas' is freely accessi-
ble."'  The late A.J. Liebling made the point humorously when he
said that freedom of the press belongs to those who own one. Fred
Friendly, professor of journalism at Columbia and former vice-pres-
ident of the Ford Foundation, has commented thoughtfully on the
consequences of technological change:
The drafters of the First Amendment assumed that all citizens
speak with equal tongues at reasonably equal decibels. The pam-
phlets of Tom Paine, beyond their biting eloquence, afforded him
no strong advantage over Alexander Hamilton. In turn, Hamil-
ton wielded great power but he could not drown out the icono-
clastic Paine by amplifying his own words through an exclusive
bullhorn.... The advent of radio forever eliminated this equal-
ity, and whatever radio did to the speaker's platform, television
43. T. EMERSON, supra note 35, at 10-11.
44. Barton, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1641-78 (1967).
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has done to radio ....
The healthy vision the framers of our Constitution had of a soci-
ety of roughly equal yeomen has also been eroded in recent years by
the conglomerate ownership of newspapers, radio and TV stations,
and book publishers, as well as by the corporate veil that shrouds
these companies from serious public scrutiny. What should be
done? One possibility is forced access to newspapers and magazines
on the part of the ordinary citizen, similar to the limited access that
the so-called Fairness Doctrine permits with electronic media,
whereby the FCC enforces a semblance of balanced reporting.4 6
But the Fairness Doctrine has existed for many decades, and critics
like Messrs. Barron and Friendly believe that it has achieved little.
More important, a guaranteed and broadened right of access to all
media would inevitably require government coercion, a cure which
many, including the ACLU, regard as worse than the disease. In
1974, the Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. Writing for
a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger said,
A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated .... Government-enforced
right of access inescapably "dampens the vigor and limits the va-
riety of public debate.",47
One may heartily agree with these words, as I do, yet deplore
the inequality that remains. Indeed, many think it is the central
problem of our society, with manifestations almost everywhere, in-
cluding in the realm of free speech.
If we look to the Enlightenment for guidance, we must recall
that it was far removed from our technological society and that lib-
erty, not equality, was its central concern. African slavery was
widely practiced. And while Montesquieu may have contributed
greatly to political philosophy by developing the theory of separa-
tion of governmental powers, he also imposed a fierce double stan-
dard on women, deploring not only their fall from virtue but even
the appearance of it.48 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand,
somewhat anticipated contemporary concerns relating to economic
45. F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GuYs, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREE SPEECH Vs. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING 15 (1977).
46. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982). See generally Red Lion Broadcasting v. Federal Communi-
cations Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
47. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974) (quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279).
48. See Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, in THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 182, 195 (L.
Crocker ed. 1969).
[Vol. 38:479
LESSONS ON LIBERTY
inequality. While observing that all individuals need not have the
same amount of power and wealth, he nevertheless asserted that
"no citizen shall have so much wealth that he can buy another, and
none so little that he is forced to sell himself."49 A great challenge
to the liberal arts-and to American society-in the next century
will be to help us move in the direction of Rousseau's hope. This
goal will not be achieved, I might observe, unless a way is found to
curb the rampant greed that afflicts so much of our culture. Unfor-
tunately, as the novelist Louis Auchincloss said recently, "Selfish-
ness and ruthlessness bring rewards."5 The only hope is to confine
or reverse this historic pattern.
A second major obstacle to a just system of free expression is
intolerance. An official form of this malady is at the root of many
smug government efforts to silence opposition. But the affliction
arises elsewhere. It took one form on university campuses during
the Vietnam War, when opponents of the war frequently disrupted
speeches by those who supported it. Heckling has a legitimate place
in public discourse, but when it reaches the point that a speaker
cannot be heard, it is unacceptable. Unfortunately, vestiges of this
behavior apparently persist on a few campuses. A more recent ex-
ample of intolerance has occurred at the hands of an organization
calling itself Accuracy in Academia. This group recruited spies-
both students and outsiders-to monitor targeted professors whom
they suspect of being "subversive" or "leftist." This effort to intimi-
date has been relatively limited, but we learned during the McCar-
thy period of the early 1950s that small beginnings can lead to
sinister ends. Academic freedom is a vital link in the relationship
between liberal arts and free expression, and it must be jealously
guarded.
I have called these two forms of behavior intolerance. They
could also be called lack of self-discipline by those who, confident of
their virtue, cannot bear to hear, and do not want others to hear,
another viewpoint. Rousseau addressed this theme: he believed
that man must discipline himself as he adjusts to the ever more
complex demands of state and society. It is a form of self-discipline
to protect the thought we hate when we have the power to throttle
it. That is exactly what the principle underlying the First Amend-
ment requires.
49. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 76 (trans. W. Kendall 1954).
50. Quoted in Smith, The Old Master and the Yuppie, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Aug. 18,
1986 at 31, 32.
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I have noted how inequality and intolerance, as well as censor-
ship, impede the free interchange of ideas so necessary for the flour-
ishing of the liberal arts. Another impediment is cowardice. I do
not mean physical cowardice, although possibly deepdown that is
involved also. I mean fear of new ideas and resulting social change,
whether it is the cataclysmic change heralded by the Renaissance or
the lesser but nevertheless wrenching change during this century as
first Roman Catholics, then Jews, and finally blacks and immigrants
from Asia and Latin America have sought a place at the high table,
and as women and homosexuals have pressed for their fair share.
We must understand those who fear change, even sympathize with
them: free speech can sometimes lead to disorder, to challenges to
personal moral codes, or to reforms that some find obnoxious.
Courage is particularly needed these days. The world is riven
by ideological, national, and communal animosities. Unless we air
our differences and try to reconcile them through an exchange of
ideas, we abandon ourselves to those who would impose their will
by force. As Anthony Lewis wrote for Harvard University's 350th
anniversary, "Terrorism has us in its psychological grip.... We
feel a loss of control. Order unravels. Institutions lose their self-
confidence. Reason itself-the belief that human problems have ra-
tional solutions-is under attack."'"
But the solution is not censorship, is not to view free speech as
just another "value" to be jettisoned when it becomes inconvenient.
A wise and principled conservative justice of the Supreme Court,
the late John Marshall Harlan, recognized that "the constitutional
right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse
and populous as ours." But he concluded that "no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests."52 The Enlightenment is
also instructive. Justice Brandeis wrote the following passage sixty
years ago, but it could have been written in 1776.
Those who won our independence were not cowards. They did
not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of
liberty. [They were] courageous, self-reliant men, with confi-
dence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through
the processes of popular government ....
If we are to fulfill the promise of the Constitution, there must be
a tolerance of ideas and styles of expression that we despise, and at
51. Lewis, Open ? Question, 89 HARVARD MAGAZINE 147 (1986).
52. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 14, 24 (1971).
53. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 376-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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the same time, as Justice Douglas said some years ago, the encour-
agement of moderation and reason in advocacy and debate.
In the last analysis, it will be the values of the liberal arts-and
of the Enlightenment-that will secure our freedom: Tolerance,
not hate; courage, not fear. Just as the eighteenth century witnessed
challenges to old ideas and the old order, we see today new chal-
lenges to established patterns of hierarchy and orthodoxy. While
we must always recall that not every new idea is a good idea, we
also must always be aware that we can never know which is which
unless all are heard and tested by logic and experience. A. Bartlett
Giamatti, president emeritus of Yale University, is a classicist dedi-
cated to the liberal arts. Upon his retirement, he said:
[T]he health of education rests on the need constantly to be
mindful of the crucial distinction between education and indoc-
trination. There are many who lust for the simple answers of
doctrine or decree.... They are the terrorists of the mind. Doc-
trine closes the mind and kills the spirit whenever it is construed
as self-contained and closed, whenever it requires exclusivity of
adherence or application or both, and whenever it claims to ex-
plain all that has happened to humanity or will happen.5"
The pursuit of truth wherever it may lie is the essence of the
liberal arts. The beneficiaries of a free society and a privileged edu-
cation have a duty to pursue the truth and to protect the freedom of
expression that makes possible the search for a new Enlightenment.
As a famous sage said in the second century, "You are not required
to complete the work, but neither are you free to desist from it."'55
54. Giamatti, Freedom of the Mind Comes First, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June
16, 1986 at 64.
55. Bloom, Introduction, in OLIVIER R. D'ALLONES, MUSICAL VARIATIONS ON Jrw-
IsH THOUGHT, 26-27 (J. Greenberg trans. 1984) (quoting Rabbi Tarphon).
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